Tuesday, 10 July 2012

Comments Remain Open

EFC 2012 VIDEO UPDATE: The videos are all still accessible, but their links have changed. Apart from the videos for Dan Dennett and John Searle, which are both correctly updated below, the video links for all the rest of the talks below are out-of-date. 
The correct, updated  links for all the videos are  at this site.

Dear All (including students enrolled for credit and other who are following the discussion online):

The comments remain open. If your comment is to a particular author, please post it as a comment on their paper. If it is for more several authors, it is best to post multiply, to each author, if you want a reply. If you just want to register the comment, you can do it on the discussion section for the day.

Sunday, 8 July 2012

X. Measuring Consciousness (Monday July 9)

Alain Ptito (McGill) Neural Mechanisms of Blindsight after Hemispherectomy: Tapping into the Unconscious
Amir Shmuel (McGill) Neurophysiological and hemodynamic measurements of spontaneous activity and functional connectivity
Gilles Plourde (McGill) General Anesthetics for the Study Consciousness
Amir Raz (McGill) Hypnosis as Experimental Tool to Study Metacognition, Causality and Volition
John Searle (Berkeley) Consciousness and Causalityabstract -- discussion thread (commentary invited) -- video (to come)

John Searle: Consciousness and Causality

            Abstract: How do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness? I think this is the most important question in the biological sciences today. Two related questions: Where exactly is consciousness realized in the brain and how does it function causally in our behavior? We know consciousness happens and we know the brain does it. How does it work? How do we approach this problem scientifically? The standard way is to go through three steps. First, try to find the neurobiological correlate of consciousness. Second, try to test if the correlations are in fact causal. Do the neurobiological states cause consciousness? Third, try to formulate a theory. Why do these processes cause consciousness at all, and why do these specific processes cause these specific conscious states? One depressing feature of this entire research project is that it does not seem to be making much progress.

Mystery of consciousness  a book by me. NYRB book
The Problem of Consciousness:
How to study consciousness scientifically
Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology

Comments invited

Amir Raz: Hypnosis as Experimental Tool to Study Metacognition, Causality and Volition

apologies: video not available
      Abstract: An early form of psychotherapy, hypnosis has been tarnished by a checkered history: stage shows, movies and cartoons that perpetuate specious myths; and individuals who unabashedly write 'hypnotist' on their business cards. Hypnosis is in the twilight zone alongside a few other mind–body exemplars. Although scientists are still unraveling how hypnosis works, little is mystical about this powerful top-down process, which is an important tool in the armamentarium of the cognitive scientist seeking to unlock topical conundrums.  Philosophical research has revealed a great deal about three categories of behavior: conscious decision-making, authorship, and sense of control. However, little conclusive evidence regarding their interdependent nature has been found, due to the difficulties in separating their influences on tasks such as decision-making.

      Demacheva, I, M Ladouceur, E Steinberg, G Pogossova, A Raz (2012) The Applied Cognitive Psychology of Attention: A Step Closer to Understanding Magic Tricks. Applied Cognitive Psychology http://www.jgh.ca/uploads/Psychiatry/Articles%20PDF/Magic1-Published.pdf
      Raz, A. (2011). Does Neuroimaging of Suggestion Elucidate Hypnotic Trance? International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 59(3), 363-377.http://www.jgh.ca/uploads/Psychiatry/Articles%20PDF/IJCEH2011.pdf
      Raz, A (2011) Hypnosis: a twilight zone of the top-down variety. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2011, Vol. 15, No. 12http://psycho.unibas.ch/fileadmin/psycho/redaktion/Abteilungen/Klinische_Psychologie_und_Psychotherapie/Raz_2011_TINS.pdf
      Raz, A., & Whatley, B. (2009) Consciousness reduced: Will neuroscience confine the mind to the brain? PsycCRITIQUES - Contemporary Psychology, 54(39).http://www.jgh.ca/uploads/Psychiatry/Articles%20PDF/PSYCCRITIQUES_consciousness_reduced.pdf
      Raz, A., & Zigman, P., (2009). Using Magic as a Vehicle to Elucidate Attention. In A. Finazzi AgrËœ et al. (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Life Sciences. London: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
      Raz, A. (2009) Varieties of Attention: A Research-Magician's Perspective. In G. Bernston and J. Cacioppo (Eds.), Handbook of Neuroscience for the Behavioural Sciences (pp. 361-369). Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. http://bit.ly/RazHypno

Comments invited

Amir Shmuel: Neurophysiological and hemodynamic measurements of spontaneous activity and functional connectivity

      Abstract: Recent functional MRI (fMRI) studies in humans have demonstrated large amplitude slow (< 0.1 Hz) fluctuations in the resting state. Importantly, these spontaneous fluctuations in the Blood-Oxygenation-Level-Dependent (BOLD) signal are often synchronized over distant parts of the brain, a phenomenon termed resting-state functional connectivity. Functional connectivity analysis identifies resting-state networks of areas that also coactivate in response to stimuli or tasks. In my talk, I'll first explore whether fMRI-measured spontaneous fluctuations reflect those seen in neurophysiological activity. I will then demonstrate that resting-state functional connectivity exists in a hierarchical manner in space. In addition to the commonly reported networks on the spatial scale of cortical areas, smaller networks can be observed at the resolution scales of sub-areas and cortical columns. I will conclude with hypotheses on the mechanisms involved, the role of spontaneous activity, and implications for clinical neuroscience.
        Carbonell F, Bellec P, Shmuel A. (2011) Neuronal Correlates of Spontaneous Fluctuations in fMRI Signals in Monkey Visual Cortex: Implications for Functional Connectivity at Rest. Brain Connect. 2011;1(6):496-510
        Shmuel A, Leopold DA (2008) Neuronal Correlates of Spontaneous Fluctuations in fMRI Signals in Monkey Visual Cortex: Implications for Functional Connectivity at Rest. Hum Brain Mapp. 2008 Jul;29(7):751-61 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18465799

        Smith et al., 2009 Correspondence of the brain's functional architecture during activation and rest http://www.pnas.org/content/106/31/13040.full

Comments invited

Gilles Plourde: General Anesthetics for the Study Consciousness

    Abstract: Although general anesthetics have been used for more than 150 years and suppress consciousness in a predictable manner, their mechanisms of action are not fully elucidated. Numerous studies have been devoted to understanding how general anesthetics impair consciousness in human subjects using either functional brain imaging or electrophysiology. These studies have obvious relevance for the study of consciousness, particularly for consciousness as a waking state and in regard to self-awareness. They have revealed the critical involvement of the thalamus and offered evidence supporting the hypothesis that the anesthetized state is associated with loss of connectivity and attenuation neuronal oscillations in the high-gamma range. In this lecture, I will first review the aspect of the pharmacology of general anesthetic that are essential to appreciate the possibilities that these drugs offer to study consciousness as well as their limitations. In the second part, I will summarize the main findings that emerge from the literature.

    Alkire MT, Hudetz AG, Tononi G. Consciousness and anesthesia. Science 2008; 322: 876-80 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2743249/
    Franks NP. General anaesthesia: from molecular targets to neuronal pathways of sleep and arousal. Nat Rev Neurosci 2008; 9: 370-86http://hopecenterdev.wustl.edu/training/bio5663/Documents/FRANKS_NATNEUROSCI_rev.pdf
    Critical involvement of the thalamus and precuneus during restoration of consciousness with physostigmine in humans during propofol anaesthesia: a positron emission tomography study http://bja.oxfordjournals.org/content/106/4/548.full

Comments invited

Alain Ptito Neural Mechanisms of Blindsight after Hemispherectomy: Tapping into the Unconscious

      Abstract: Hemispherectomy subjects (Hs) have offered a unique opportunity to study the role that subcortical structures play in blindsight because the hemisphere contralateral to the blind field is absent or non-functional. We first showed Hs could detect and localize simple targets and moving gratings, discriminate grating velocity and differentiate forms in their blind field. We suggested a role of subcortical pathways i.e. the superior colliculi (SC), with the participation of the remaining hemisphere. We reported the existence of residual vision with awareness in the blind field and showed that Hs were insensitive to motion-in-depth in their hemianopic field and that some possess blindsight as shown by a spatial summation effect i.e. subjects only react to the stimulus presented in their intact field, without being aware that the simultaneous presentation of another stimulus in their blind field lowers their reaction time. We hypothesized that this indirect method to evaluate blindsight could involve subcortical mechanisms without requiring cortical processing, and without the subject's awareness. We then reported that the cellular integrity and metabolism of the ipsilateral SC in the vervet monkey are much less affected than those of the dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus (dLGN) after neonatal hemispherectomy. We underlined the importance of controlling intraocular light scatter and published the first fMRI study on residual vision. We concluded that the SC are likely implicated in blindsight in Hs, and we recently utilized the color vision properties of collicular cells to demonstrate its involvement in the residual visual abilities of Hs. Since the primate SC does not receive retinal input from shortwave-sensitive (S-) cones involved in colour vision, consequently rendering them colour blind to blue yellow stimuli, we tested 3 Hs who had reliably shown blindsight. They demonstrated a spatial summation effect only to achromatic stimuli suggesting that their blindsight is colour-blind to blue/yellow stimuli and is not receiving input from retinal S-cones. We concluded that blindsight is likely mediated by the SC in Hs. We were the first to use Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) Tractography to investigate pulvinar connectivity in humans and SC connectivity in Hs with and without blindsight. We demonstrated the presence of projections from the ipsi- and contralesional SC to primary visual areas, visual association areas, precentral areas/FEF and the internal capsule of the remaining hemisphere in Hs with 'Type I' or 'attention-blindsight' and an absence of these connections in Hs without it. In another study using fMRI, we demonstrated in Hs that achromatic stimuli but not S-cone-isolating stimuli in the blind field of a subject with blindsight activated visual areas FEF/ V5 and that the cortical activation pattern was enhanced by achromatic stimuli only. We concluded that the human SC is blind to S-cone-isolating stimuli, and that blindsight is mediated by an S-cone-independent collicular pathway, at least in Hs.
      The SC is the main recipient of retinal projections in lower mammals with a phylogenetically older and more primitive visual system than humans. Similar but weaker retinocollicular projections also exist in humans. Although existing SC connections to the remaining cortical areas seem to play a pivotal role in unconscious vision, blindsight subjects remain unaware of the information processed in their blind visual field. One possibility for the lack of awareness may lie in the lack of synchronicity in cerebral activation. The human visual pathways process information simultaneously and yet are able to work independently of each other (as is the case following a circumscribed lesion in a visual cortical area). For conscious perception, however, a specific synchronized activation pattern of different cortical areas involving ventral, parietal and frontal visual areas is believed to be crucial. Our results indicate that Hs with 'Type I' or'attention blindsight' are able to enhance visual performance in their blind field, but remain unaware of visual processing presumably because they are unable to access a more complex synchronous cortical activation pattern involving higher top-down mechanisms necessary for conscious vision.

      Neural substrates of blindsight after hemispherectomy http://unfweb.criugm.qc.ca/jdoyon/cours_6032/Neuroscientist%202007.pdf
      Unconscious vision: new insights into the neuronal correlate of blindsight using diffusion tractography http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/129/7/1822.full
      Neural Substrates of Blindsight in Hemispherectomized Subjects. http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca/~sandra/pdfs/Review_2007.pdf
      The nature of consciousness in the visually deprived brain http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3111253/

Comments invited

Stefano Mancuso: Evolution of Plant Intelligence

Unfortunately, Professor Mancuso had to cancel his trip in the last minute for personal reasons, but here is a TED video that gives the flavour of his work. Comments are still invited, on his video and on the linked readings. It is possible (though not certain) that Professor Mancuso will reply to the comments.

      Abstract: Intelligent behavior is a complex adaptive phenomenon that has evolved to enable organisms to deal with variable environmental circumstances. Maximizing fitness requires skill in foraging for necessary resources (food) in competitive circumstances and is probably the activity in which intelligent behavior is most easily seen. Biologists suggest that intelligence encompasses the characteristics of detailed sensory perception, information processing, learning, memory, choice, optimisation of resource sequestration with minimal outlay, self-recognition, and foresight by predictive modeling. All these properties are concerned with a capacity for problem solving in recurrent and novel situations. I will review the evidence that individual plant species exhibit all of these intelligent behavioral capabilities but do so through phenotypic plasticity, not movement. Furthermore it is in the competitive foraging for resources that most of these intelligent attributes have been detected. Plants should therefore be regarded as prototypical intelligent organisms, a concept that has considerable consequences for investigations of whole plant communication, computation and signal transduction.
    It should not be surprising that neuronal computation is not limited to animal brains but is used also by bacteria and plants. It is generally assumed that brains and neurons represent late evolutionary achievements which are present only in more advanced animals. But recent data suggest that our understanding of bacteria, unicellular eukaryotic organisms, plants, brains and neurons, rooted in Aristotelian philosophy is flawed. Neural aspects of biological systems are obvious already in bacteria and unicellular biological units such as sexual gametes and diverse unicellular eukaryotic organisms. Altogether, processes and activities thought to represent evolutionarily 'recent' specializations of the nervous system may be ancient and fundamental cell survival processes.

      Mindless mastery - Nature 2002 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Nature%202002%20Trewavas.pdf
      Aspects of Plant Intelligence - Annals pf Botany 2003 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Ann%20Bot%202003%20Trewavas.pdf
      Plant intelligence - Naturwissenschaften 2005 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Naturwissenschaften%202005%20Trewavas.pdf
      Green plants as intelligent organisms - TRENDS in Plant Science 2005 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Trends%202005%20Trewavas.pdf
      Plant Neurobiology as a Paradigm Shift Not Only in the Plant Sciences http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Plant%20Signaling%20&%20Behavior%20%202007%20F.pdf
      Plant neurobiology: no brain, no gain? - TRENDS in Plant Science 2007 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Trends%202007%20Alpi.pdf
      Response to Alpi et al.: Plant neurobiology: the gain is more than the name - TRENDS in Plant Science 2007http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Trends%202007%20Brenner.pdf
      Response to Alpi et al.: Plant neurobiology - all metaphors have value - TRENDS in Plant Science 2007 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Trends%202007%20Trewavas.pdf
      Reflections on 'plant neurobiology' - BioSystems 2008 http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/BioSystems%202008%20Barlow.pdf
      Plant neurobiology: from sensory biology, via plant communication, to social plant behavior - Cognitive Process 2009http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Cognitive%20processing%202008.pdf
      Spatiotemporal dynamics of the electrical network activity in the root apex - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2009http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/PNAS%202009%20Masi.pdf
      Deep evolutionary origins of neurobiology - Communicative & Integrative Biology 2009http://www.linv.org/images/about_pdf/Communicative%20Integrative%20Biology%20%202009%20.pdf

Comments invited

IX. Evolutionary Advantages of Felt Functions (Sunday July 8)

Stefano Mancuso (LINV, Italy) Evolution of Plant Intelligence CANCELLED
Gualtiero Piccinini (UMO, St Louis) Is Consciousness a Spandrel? 
Malcolm MacIver (Northwestern) Sensory and Motor Spaces and the Emergence of Multiple Futures 
Jennifer Mather (Lethbridge) Evolutionary Pressures and Cephalopod Consciousness 
Eva Jablonka (TAU, Israel) Evolutionary Origins of Experiencing 

Eva Jablonka: Evolutionary Origins of Experiencing

      Abstract: An approach focused on the evolutionary transition to experiencing -- to the first organisms with phenomenal consciousness -- “can enable the identification of fundamental organizational principles involved in experiencing. Based on the heuristics of the origin-of-life research, we outline a parallel approach to experiencing, and suggest that just as function emerged with the transition to life, felt-needs emerged with the transition to experiencing. We argue that experiencing is a facet of open-ended associative learning in neural animals with a CNS, and that the evolution of associative learning was a key factor in the metazoan diversification during the Cambrian. It endowed animals with motivation and increased their discrimination powers on the basis of systemic reward systems. Tracking the molecular and neural correlates of associative learning as they emerged during evolutionary history may therefore shed light on the dynamics that underlie elementary forms of experiencing.

      Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka (2010) Experiencing: a Jamesian approach   Journal of Consciousness Studies 17:102-124.http://www.openu.ac.il/Personal_sites/download/Simona-Ginsburg/Experiencing-A-Jamesian-Approach2010.pdf    
      Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka (2007) The Transition to Experiencing: I. Limited Learning and Limited Experiencing  Biological Theory. 2(3) 218-230.
      Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka (2007) The Transition to Experiencing: II. The Evolution of Associative Learning Based on Feelings. Biological Theory 2(3) 231-243
      Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka (2010) Associative learning: a factor in the Cambrian explosion. Journal of Theoretical Biology 266:11-20.

Comments invited

Jennifer Mather: Evolutionary Pressures and Cephalopod Consciousness

Jennifer Mather   Evolutionary Pressures and Cephalopod Consciousness
Abstract: On the face of it, cephalopods are unlikely candidates for consciousness, even at a primary level.  They stem from slow, simple molluscan ancestors, but during evolution they have lost the protective shell.   Likely in the competition with bony fishes, they have instead developed a centralized brain, acute vision, complex control of arm movement and a stunning skin display system.  But unlike other non-human animals with well developed cognition, they are not social.  What would the evolutionary pressure be, then, for these animals to develop consciousness?  The answer may lie in the complexity of their near-shore marine environment.  Mobile cephalopods must search this environment to find prey, and octopuses do so with a saltatory search technique.   At the same time they are vulnerable to predators and have an array of defenses, from camouflage to false eye spots and ink release to flight, to avoid or react to them.  Yet they are mobile—octopuses move to a new home range every ten days or two weeks—so they cannot store information and responses to form automatic loops.  It may be this constant change and pressure to update that caused the cephalopods to develop a simple form of consciousness.

      Mather, J. A. (2008).  Cephalopod consciousness: Behavioral evidence.  Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 37-48
      Mather, J. A. (2010).  What might consciousness in cephalopods be like? Journal of Cosmology (special issue on consciousness)http://journalofcosmology.com/Consciousness113.html
      Philosophical background of attitudes toward and treatment of invertebrates http://research.tamucc.edu/compliance/iacuc/PDF/ILAR%20Journal.pdf#page=91
      Behavioural indicators of pain in crustacean decapods http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0021-25712009000400013&script=sci_arttext
      Pain and suffering in invertebrates? http://www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/231732.pdf
      New evidence of animal consciousness http://postcog.ucd.ie/files/fulltext.pdf
      [See also David Edelman reference list]

Comments invited

Malcolm MacIver: Sensory and Motor Spaces and the Emergence of Multiple Futures

      Abstract: Back in our watery days as fish, we lived in a medium that was inherently unfriendly to seeing things very far away. The technical way this is measured is the "attenuation length" of light through the medium. After light travels the attenuation length through a medium, about 63% of the light is blocked. The attenuation length of light in water is on the order of tens of meters. For a beast of a meter or two in length, which moves at a rate of about a body length or two per second, that's a pretty short horizon of time and space. In just a few seconds, you'll reach the edge of where you were able to see. If you're down in the depths at all, or in less clear water, you may reach the edge of your perceptual horizon in about a second. In this talk, I'll explore the quantification of sensory and motor spaces, developed through our work on the weakly electric fish, a popular model system of sensory neurobiology. I discuss the relationship between behavioral control and the relative size of these spaces. Finally, I'll discuss whether emergence on to land, where the attenuation length of light is essentially infinite, may have been a key step in producing favorable conditions for the evolution of the ability to plan over multiple possible futures.

      Neuroethology From Morphological Computation to Planning
      Omnidirectional Sensory and Motor Volumes in Electric Fish

Comments invited

Gualtiero Piccinini: Is Consciousness a Spandrel?

      Abstract: Assigning a biological function to phenomenal consciousness appears to be needed to explain its evolutionary origin. For evolution by natural selection operates on organisms' traits based on the functions they fulfill. And yet identifying the function(s) of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is facilitating mental processes such as learning or reasoning. But mental processes such as learning and reasoning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances such processes. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness is a spandrel, that is, a byproduct of other traits that has no functions of its own. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.

      S. J. Gould and R. C. Lewontin (1979), 'The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,' Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 205, 581-598.

Comments invited

VIII. Consciousness and Causality (Saturday July 7)

VIII. Consciousness and Causality (Saturday July 7)
Simon Baron-Cohen (Cambridge UK) Evolution of Empathy 
Alfred Mele (FSU) Do Conscious Decisions Ever Play a Role in Action Production? 
Hakwan Lau (Columbia) How to study the functions of subjective awareness? 
Luiz Pessoa (U Maryland) Cognitive-Emotional Interactions 
Marthe Kiley-Worthington (EEREC, France) Comparing Elephant and Equine Mental Traits, Subjectivity and Consciousness 
Axel Cleermans (ULB, Belgium) Consciousness and Learning 

Saturday, 7 July 2012

Axel Cleeremans: Consciousness and Learning

      Abstract: Here, starting from the fact that neural activity is intrinsically unconscious, I suggest that consciousness arises as a result of the brain's continuous attempts at predicting not only the consequences of action on the world and on other agents, but also the consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of metarepresentations that characterize and qualify their target representations. Such re-representations form the basis of conscious experience, and also subtend successful control of action. In a sense thus, this is the enactive perspective, but turned both inwards and further outwards. Consciousness amounts to 'signal detection on the mind'; it is the brain's (non-conceptual, embodied, implicit) theory about itself. By this hypothesis, which I call the "radical plasticity thesis", consciousness critically depends on a cognitive system's ability to learn about (1) the effects of its actions on the environment, (2) the effects of its actions on other agents, and on (3) the effects of activity in one cerebral region on other cerebral regions.

      Cleeremans, A. (2011). The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the brain learns to be conscious. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 1-12. http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/07-PBR.pdf
      Timmermans, B., Schilbach, L., Pasquali, A., & Cleeremans, A. (2012).
Higher-order thoughts in action: Consciousness as an unconscious redescription process Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B
      Pasquali, A., Timmermans, B., & Cleeremans, A.(2010).
Know thyself: Metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness

Comments invited

Marthe Kiley-Worthington: Comparing Elephant and Equine Mental Traits, Subjectivity and Consciousness

      Abstract: A combination of both reviewed scientific knowledge and knowledge gathered from philosophy of mind, critically assessed anecdotes & centuries of folk knowledge concerning the cognition of other mammals (Conditional Anthropomorphism) is proposed as a rational method to begin to outline these species subjectivity & consciousness. This paper briefly examines mammalian similarities and species differences in bodies & behaviour ( sensations, feelings, emotions learning, ecological and social knowledge, rationality, dreaming & imagination, awareness of self, theory of mind & comprehension of human language) , their  probable resulting mental attitudes, subjectivity and type of consciousness. Such an approach allows a greater understanding of another species consciousness, and can, perhaps, enrich our own.

    A comparative study of equine and elephant mental attributes leading to an acceptance of their subjectivity and consciousness . M.Kiley-Worthington. Journal of  Consciousness Exploration & Research  Jan 2011 vol 2 p 10-50.  http://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/126
    Animals in circuses and zoos: Chiron's world http://www.cabdirect.org/abstracts/19912259033.html

Comments invited